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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

VISUALIZING FORESEEABILITY

PATRICIA K. FITZSIMMONS* AND BRIDGET GENTEMAN HOY**
We ought not to have been surprised that our torts class differed from the
average first-year law school course; our professor began the first class by
reading a Ralph Nader interview. He caught our attention and from that day
forward taught the law of torts in a decidedly unconventional manner.
Throughout the semester, our instructor presented the field of tort law as a
series of doctrines existing on a continuum,1 stretching from intentional torts
with discrete elements (including a mental state that must be proven before
imposing liability) at one end, to absolute liability at the other end. We learned
that judges decide where on the continuum to place a certain disfavored or
prohibited act by “collapsing” tort doctrine, emphasizing or de-emphasizing
elements of the doctrine to suit their needs.2 We considered whether decisionmakers act as “gatekeepers” by denying application of tort liability to whole
classes of acts or “tweakers” who make adjustments along the continuum on a
case-by-case basis. And we learned that foreseeability is best described as
“strawberry shortcake.”
The day this revelation was made began like any other. Our professor was
pacing around the auditorium-style classroom, climbing up and down the steps
on either side as we discussed the relevance of foreseeability in determining
whether a defendant’s act was the cause of a plaintiff’s injury. Should all
foreseeable results be attributed to an act? What about results that were caused
directly by the defendant’s actions, but were not reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the act? In the midst of this discussion, a student asked for an
* J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful for this unique opportunity
to contribute to the “Teaching Torts” special issue. Thanks are due to my family for their
encouragement during my law school career, and to my co-author for her friendship and support.
** J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law. It is a special treat to participate in the
Law Journal’s “Teaching” series, initiated with “Teaching Contracts” in Volume 44. See
Teaching Contracts, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1193 (2000). The opportunity has allowed me to reflect
on the challenges and successes of my three years at the Saint Louis University School of Law,
and in doing so, I am reminded that my success would have been greatly hindered if not for the
patience of family and friends.
1. See, e.g., JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 163-97
(2d ed. 1997) (containing sections titled Categorization of Socially Desirable Activities and
Doctrinal Subcategories and Characterization).
2. See Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 717 (1993).
907

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

908

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:907

explanation of how fact-finders determine whether a certain result was
foreseeable.
Our instructor responded by proclaiming: “What is
foreseeability? Foreseeability is strawberry shortcake!” Needless to say, this
declaration took us all by surprise.
Like many legal terms, foreseeability is hard to define clearly.3 The word
“foreseeable” has unique legal meaning; unfortunately, it also has a common
meaning and that, ultimately, is what confuses things. Foreseeability is an
attempt to predict at what point the “causal relationship between [one person’s]
conduct and [another person’s] injury is too attenuated, remote, or freakish to
justify imposing liability.”4 This prediction must be called something, and
borrowing “foreseeable” from the common lexicon undoubtedly seems a
logical choice. However, any term could have been chosen because
“foreseeable” in a legal context means much more than what the average firstyear law student may expect. In other words, a foreseeable act may just as
well be called “strawberry shortcake.”5
As in any torts class, we studied foreseeability in the contexts of duty,
breach and causation.
Under each discrete element of negligence,
foreseeability played a role. In the duty analysis, the concept of foreseeability
arose at least twice: Justice Bird’s foreseeability test found in Bigbee v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co.6 and the Rowland/Weirum factors enumerated in
Rowland v. Christian7 and Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.8 In Bigbee,
California Supreme Court Justice Rose Bird “collapsed” duty into the breach
and causation analyses, allowing the jury to determine whether a duty existed
based on the foreseeability of the result.9 Her approach embraced hindsight
and an application of the law on a fact-sensitive, case-by-case basis.10 On the
other hand, the earlier California Supreme Court cases of Rowland v. Christian
and Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. advocated the use of foreseeability as one
factor among many used in a cost/benefit analysis of risk allocation.11 The
3. For a discussion of “famous court decisions and numerous scholarly articles” which have
attempted to define at what point an act is or is not foreseeable, see JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 203-04 (1996).
4. Id.
5. This, of course, is our interpretation. Our Torts professor may very well have had other
intentions. Any misunderstanding is admittedly due to our own shortcomings as newcomers to
the field of torts.
6. 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983).
7. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
8. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
9. Bigbee, 665 P.2d at 952-53.
10. “[F]oreseeability is not to be measured by what is more probable than not, but includes
whatever is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person]
would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.” Id. at 952.
11. See McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), reprinted in
PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 693-99 (listing factors to be considered).
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Rowland/Weirum approach serves a gatekeeping function in that a judge’s
determination of whether or not a duty exists can keep an entire class of
actions from falling under the aegis of tort liability.12
Under the breach analysis, we learned that foreseeability was the focal
point of risk contextualization. The risk created by an act determines whether
performing the act was unreasonable—hence, a determination of the
foreseeability of the risk must be made by a court before deciding to impose
tort liability for the performance. For example, in Hill v. Yaskin,13 the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated:
In order to ascertain the existence vel non of a duty owed by either defendant
in the circumstances before us, it is necessary to determine whether or not
probable harm to one in the position of this injured plaintiff . . . should
reasonably have been anticipated from defendant’s conduct. The issue of
foreseeability in this sense must be distinguished from the issue of
foreseeability as that concept may be said to relate to the question of whether
the specific act or omission of the defendant was such that the ultimate injury
to the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable result so as to constitute a
proximate cause of the injury. Simply put, the distinction is between
foreseeability as it affects the duty determination and foreseeability as it is
sometimes applied to proximate cause, a critical distinction too often (because
too easily) overlooked.14

Finally, foreseeability made a mess of what naïve first-years would simply
call “causation.” We saw that different courts applied various levels of
foreseeability when determining if an injury was proximately caused by a
defendant’s conduct.15 In The Wagon Mound I,16 the court used a straight
foreseeability test, holding the defendant liable only for those injuries that were
foreseeable at the time the act occurred. We learned that this was actually a
duty issue, collapsing the elements of negligence. The court expanded this
concept of foreseeability in The Wagon Mound II,17 holding that so long as the

12. The Rowland/Weirum “factors have been used frequently by California judges
confronted with challenging duty questions. Other jurisdictions have borrowed these factors or
use similar ones.” DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 3, at 112 n.3.
13. 380 A.2d 1107 (N.J. 1977), reprinted in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 240-45.
14. Hill, 380 A.2d at 1109 (emphasis added).
15. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 3, at 203-17.
16. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon Mound I),
[1961] A.C. 388, reprinted in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 901-05 (holding the defendant not
liable for injuries after spilled oil was ignited on water because the consequence was not
reasonably foreseeable).
17. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller S.S. Co. Pty. (The Wagon Mound II), [1967]
A.C. 617, reprinted in part in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 905-06 (finding the defendant
liable for damage resulting from the same fire as in The Wagon Mound I because although the
risk of fire was low, the potential harm was great, and a “reasonable man would have realized or
foreseen or prevented the risk”).
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same general type of risk was foreseeable at the time the act occurred,
proximate cause existed. Finally, In re Polemis18 taught that direct cause was
the only appropriate standard, ignoring foreseeability considerations altogether
(and collapsing proximate cause into but-for cause).
Soon, we realized that what we understood foreseeability to mean in a nonlegal sense was far too simplistic when applied to legal questions. As amateurs
at the law, we, like other first years, wanted to place fact patterns in neat legal
categories. The confusion surrounding the legal definition of “foreseeability”
ultimately illustrated that legal concepts are not composed of orderly
compartments, but rather are interwoven, abstract and loose.19
Much to a first-year law student’s dismay, this interweaving of the law is
celebrated. The law is not well served by narrowly defining every legal term
as a first-year student may expect. Rather, it allows one concept, like
foreseeability, to apply to vastly different fact patterns. The infinite scenarios
encountered by attorneys and judges demand an open-ended approach to
solving legal problems, and therefore demand the avoidance of restrictive legal
terms. This idea, of course, is not novel and is certainly not specific to
foreseeability. The need for flexibility in the law has been recognized from the
beginnings of our legal system. In McCulloch v. Maryland, for instance,
Justice Marshall declared that the Constitution could not explicitly spell out the
powers granted by it, or else it “would partake of the prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.”20 Rather, “its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the
objects themselves.”21
To the readers of this essay, and to anyone who has met the challenge of
being a “One L”22 with even the slightest success, the proposition that the law
must be flexible is far from earth-shattering.23 Nevertheless, to a first-year law
student who is trying to keep her head above water, this fundamental notion is
easily lost in the reading, outlining and memorizing shuffle. For many,
recognizing the subtle ideas underlying the more manageable legal doctrines
18. 3 K.B. 560 (1921), reprinted in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 898-900 (finding
defendants liable under a direct causation theory where a dropped plank created a spark, igniting
petrol fumes and destroying a ship).
19. In his contribution to this “Teaching” issue Professor Jerry Phillips notes this confusion,
asking why in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), Cardozo “confuse[s]
generations of law students by talking about duty instead of foreseeability.” See Jerry J. Phillips,
Law School Teaching, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 727 (2001).
20. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
21. Id.
22. See SCOTT TUROW, ONE L (1977).
23. Readers of Professor Phillips’s essay will note he prefers to “work with elasticizing
judicial concepts” and therefore will be unsurprised by our thesis. See Phillips, supra note 19, at
726.
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takes several semesters24 and requires an opportunity to reflect on the concepts
which were initially too foreign to fully comprehend.25
Perhaps our professors give us more credit than we deserve and imagine
that we see the big picture with more clarity than is possible so early in our
legal endeavors. A professor approaching a first-year course such as Torts
should not be afraid to spell out fundamental notions of the law—such as the
need for flexibility in defining legal concepts—throughout the semester rather
than waiting and hoping that students will be able to turn the light on to the
broad picture themselves. This is not to say that first-year students need to be
spoon-fed, for the intellectual challenge of “learning the law”26 is not only
welcomed, it is a necessity for one who aspires to solve legal problems and
“think like a lawyer.” That being said, reinforcing legal subtleties can only aid
in opening the eyes of wary first-year students who are likely bogged down in
the search for tidy definitions that can be memorized and indiscriminately
applied.
The sometimes tedious process of visualizing the broader legal picture is,
to be sure, an integral component of the law school experience. In upperdivision courses, many professors take advantage of the lessons to which firstyear students were introduced but were unable to fully appreciate at the time.27
Each time a professor brings a second- or third-year student back to the firstyear courses by analogy or reference, the student benefits by gaining a glimpse
of the legal web. In the end, it is, of course, the student who must make the
effort to look at legal concepts with a grand view, but each opportunity a
professor can provide helps students take a step in the right direction.
Regarding foreseeability, Torts introduced us to the concept and attempted
to show us its flexibility. “Strawberry shortcake” helped us look past the
narrow definition we were inclined to apply and see foreseeability as a
malleable standard used by judges in their roles as gatekeepers and tweakers.
We presume many students finish their first year of law school without coming
to this realization. Maybe no real harm is done, but we recommend professors
seize every opportunity to help students see the law in a new light.

24. Foreseeability appears in any number of upper-division courses, including Jurisprudence,
Admiralty and Criminal Law (currently offered as an upper-division course at our school). By
the time students enroll in these courses, they are expected to have an easier time working with
the conceptual quality of the law, spend less time trying to define everything and more time
actually learning how to understand and apply the law.
25. Few students are given such an opportunity as contributing to a “Teaching” symposium
and therefore have little occasion to reflect on what they take away from a class other than the
substantive law taught.
26. This may more appropriately be described as “learning to understand the law,” as other
articles in the special issue on “Teaching Torts” point out.
27. Thankfully, a number of professors at the Saint Louis University School of Law make
generous efforts to reinforce what we learned as first-year students.
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